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COpy 
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
JAMES & JACKSON LLC, individually and 
derivatively on behalf of MBC, GOSPEL 
NETWORK, LLC., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
EV ANDER HOLYFIELD, JR., WILLIE E. 
GARY, CECIL FIELDER, LORENZO 
WILLIAMS, THOMAS WEIKSNAR, CHAN 
ABNEY, LORI METOYER-BROWN, and 
RICK NEWBERGER, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) Civil Action No.: 2006CV124372 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
Counsel appeared before the Court via telephone conference on September 6, 2007, to present 
argument on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Having reviewed the record of the case, the briefs 
(including supplemental briefs filed on September 20 and 21,2007) filed on this Motion, and the 
arguments ofthe parties, this Court finds as follows: 
Ie Facts 
Plaintiff James & Jackson LLC ("J&1") is a founding member ofMBC Gospel Network LLC 
("MBC") (alk/a, "The Black Family Channel"), a Delaware limited liability company. J&J consists of 
four members: Alvin James, Marlon Jackson, Matthew Harden Jr., and Gregory Thorpe. Willie Gary 
LLC is the other owner ofMBC. Willie Gary LLC has twenty-three members including Defendants 
Evander Holyfield, Jr., Willie E. Gary, Cecil Fielder, Lorenzo Williams, Chan Abney, Lori Metoyer-
Brown, all of whom were on the management board ofMBC and all of whom are owners in 
Programming Acquisitions LLC ("Programming Acquisitions"). Defendant Rick Newberger was the 
J:\James & Jackson LLC\ORDER -MTD.doc 1 
CEO ofMBC and is an owner of Programming Acquisitions. Defendant Thomas Weiksnar was on the 
management board ofMBC and is also an owner in Programming Acquisitions. 
Plaintiffpleads a series of facts in the complaint relating to the alleged mismanagement and 
merger ofMBC. First, pursuant to the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement ofMBC Gospel 
Network LLC ("Operating Agreement"), MBC was reorganized in 1999 with Willie Gary LLC owning 
80% and J&J holding a 20% "non-dilutable" interest in the company. Second, Willie Gary LLC 
initiated an action against J&J in Delaware Court of Chancery to dilute J&J's interest in MBC. 
Plaintiff alleges in its verified complaint that the Delaware Chancery Court recommended a 'judicial 
dissolution ofMBC with a competitive auction ofMBC's assets." Third, on April 10, 2006, Plaintiff 
alleges that Defendants announced the proposed merger between MBC and Programming Acquisitions 
LLC. By April 26, 2006, the merger was completed with a $1 cash-out value to MBC's members. 
Fourth, Plaintiff asserts that the merger was not the result of an arm's length transaction because 
Defendants failed to form an independent special committee to review/approve the transaction, hire 
independent counsel for the minority interests, or hire an independent financial expert to conduct a 
valuation ofMBC. Fifth, Plaintiff alleges a series ofbreached duties and obligations on behalf of the 
Defendants, including a breach of the terms ofthe Operating Agreement relating to Willie Gary LLC's 
obligation to provide capital contributions. Plaintiff alleges that Willie Gary LLC had an obligation to 
fund all future capital needs ofMBC, but that when Willie Gary LLC supplied such funds, they were 
mischaracterized as loans instead of contributions. 
II. Standard 
A party seeking a motion to dismiss brought under OCGA § 9-11-12(b)( 6) for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted must demonstrate that Plaintiff s allegations in the complaint 
disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts 
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asserted in support thereof Common Cause/Georgia v. City of Atlanta, 279 Ga. 480, 481 (2005). The 
internal affairs of a corporation, such as actions involving officers and directions, shall be regulated by 
the law of the state of incorporation. Diedrich v. Miller & Meier & Assoc., Architects & Planners, 
Inc., 254 Ga. 734, 735 (1985). 
III. Venue 
As a threshold matter, the Court will address Defendants' arguments relating to improper venue as 
raised in oral argument on September 6, 2007, and in their supplemental brief filed September 20, 
2007. Under the Georgia Civil Practice Act, 12(b) defenses, including improper venue, must be raised 
at or before the time of pleading. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b). Such defenses may be raised in the 
pleadings or in a separate motion. "If a party makes a motion under this Code section but omits 
therefrom any defense or objection then available to him which this Code section permits to be raised 
by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on the defense or objection so omitted ... " 
O.C.G.A. § 12(g); see also, 1 2(h); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Morrison, 187 Ga. App. 780 (1988) 
(requiring a defendant to assert the defense of improper venue in the responsive pleadings). 
Defendants filed nine (9) separate answers, each on December 8, 2006. Included in their answer, 
each Defendant listed as its first defense Plaintiffs failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted. Additionally, on December 8, 2006, Defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The supporting memorandum oflaw, filed on 
December 11, 2006, cited Plaintiff s failure to meet the demand requirement for a derivative suit as the 
basis for their 12(b)(6) motion. Not until September 6,2007, was the defense of improper venue 
raised. While it is true that 12(b) defenses and objections can be consolidated into a single motion, the 
Court finds that adding new 12(b) defense ten (10) months after the initial response and motion to 
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dismiss was filed ignores the notice and timing requirements set forth in O.e.G.A. § 9-11-12. Thus, 
the issue of venue is not properly before this Court. 
IV. Derivative vs. Direct Claims 
Defendants argue in their supplemental briefthat Count One (Breach of Fiduciary Duty), Count 
Three (Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty), and Count Four (Conspiracy to Breach 
Fiduciary Duties) brought on behalf of J& J are not direct, but are derivative claims. 
State law determines whether a cause of action is direct or derivative. "Georgia applies the law of 
the state of incorporation to derivative actions ... " Hantz v. Belyew, 194 Fed. Appx. 897,900 (lIth 
Cir. 2006). In this case, Delaware is the state of incorporation. 
The distinction between direct and derivative claims is determined by the Court's two-prong 
analysis of (l) who suffered the alleged harm, and (2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery. 
Tooley v. Donaldson, 845 A. 2d 1031 (Del. 2004) (adopting a two-part test for distinguishing direct 
from derivative claims and abandoning the "special injury" and "equal affect upon shareholders" 
analysis relied upon in earlier cases). 
Additionally, the Delaware Courts have recognized that claims can be both derivative and direct 
such as where, in a traditional derivative action, the injury falls disproportionately upon a minority 
shareholder. Rhodes v. Silkroad Equity LLC, 2007 WL 2058736 (Del. Ch., Julyll, 2007); see also 
Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A. 2d 91 (Del. 2006) (allowing derivative claims to be brought as individual, 
direct claims where the majority shareholder sold the corporation assets which drove down the value of 
the corporation thus increasing the majority shareholder's value and voting power and decreasing the 
minority shareholder's value and voting power). The Delaware Courts have recognized a direct harm 
to a minority shareholder where the economic value of a company was extracted and voting power was 
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redistributed away from the minority shareholder to the majority shareholder. Gentile v. Rossette, 906 
A. 2d at 99-100; see also, Rhodes, 2007 WL 2058736 at *5. 
In Rhodes, the Court allowed the breach of fiduciary duty claims raised by the minority 
shareholder against the majority shareholder to proceed as direct claims because the defendants "as 
controlling shareholder would not have suffered harm to the same extent and proportions as the 
plaintiff." 2007 WL 2058736 at *5. The Court characterized the breach of fiduciary duty claims as 
"facilitating their [majority shareholders] efforts to drive out the plaintiffs at a bargain price ... [thus] the 
fiduciary duty claims alleged in the complaint can be brought as direct claims." Id. 
As in Rhodes, J&J was the minority and only other shareholder in MBC at the time that the merger 
was approved. MBC, through the control of Defendants, approved and finalized the cash-out merger 
with Programming Acquisitions, which was owned and controlled by Defendants, for $1. Thus, as in 
Rhodes, the Willie Gary LLC, the majority shareholder in MBC, acting through its interested directors 
who are the named Defendants in this suit, approved the merger with Programming Acquisitions in a 
transaction that drove down the value ofMBC and extracted the economic value of the company from 
J&J, the minority shareholder. 
In Gentile, the plaintiffs claims arose form a self-dealing transaction in which the CEO and 
controlling stockholder issued himself stock at an inflated rate in exchange for forgiving the 
corporation's debt owed to him. 906 A.2d at 93. The result of the transaction was to decrease the 
minority shareholder's economic value and voting power in the corporation. In Gentile, the Delaware 
Supreme Court recognized that the same set of facts gave rise to two different types of injuries: the 
first to the corporation and the second to the minority shareholder. See, id. at 99-100. In this case, the 
alleged harm to MBC is the undervaluation of the $1 cash-out merger and the specific harm allegedly 
suffered by J&J was the disproportionate harm suffered by it, the minority shareholder as a result of 
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the cash-out merger. Additionally, like in Gentile, J&J, the minority shareholder ofMBC, allegedly 
suffered a unique harm resulting from "a breach of a fiduciary duty owed to them by the controlling 
shareholder, namely, not to cause the corporation to effect a transaction that would benefit the 
fiduciary at the expense of the minority stockholders." Id. at 103. 
Distinguishing derivative from direct claims in this case is a difficult analysis for the Court because 
both types of claims share common facts (the cash-out merger). The Gentile and Rhodes cases, 
however, demonstrate a line of cases where Delaware Courts recognize claims as being both derivative 
and direct. Because J&J pled facts alleging a redistribution of economic value and control to the 
majority shareholder as well as a breach of fiduciary duties owed to them by the interested directors, 
Plaintiff pled sufficient facts to withstand Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for failing to state a claim for 
a direct action. 
v. Standing to Raise Derivative Claims' 
Second, Defendants argue that as a result of the cash-out merger that extinguished MBC, Plaintiff 
lacks the standing to bring derivative claims on MBC's behalf in Count Two (Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty), Count Three (Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty), and Count Four (Conspiracy to 
Breach Fiduciary Duties). In order to have standing to bring a derivative claim, the plaintiff must be "a 
member or an assignee of a limited liability company interest at the time of bringing the action and ... at 
the time of the transaction of which the plaintiff complains ... " 6 Del. C. § 18-1002 (2007). 
The effect of a merger is normally to deprive a plaintiff, a member of the merged company, the 
standing to bring a derivative suit. Lewis v. Ward, 852 A.2d 896, 899 (Del. 2004); see also, Lewis v. 
Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040 (Del. 1984). Two exceptions, however, are recognized to the post-merger 
derivative claim standing rule which allows a plaintiff to bring a derivate suit on behalf of a merged 
company: (1) if the merger itself is the subject of a claim of fraud, or (2) if the merger is in reality 
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"merely a reorganization" that does not affect plaintifPs ownership in the business. Kramer v. 
Western Pacific Industries, Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 354 (Del. 1988), citing, Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 
at 1046. The fraud exception must be pled with particularity. Lewis v. Ward, 852 A.2d at 905. 
MBC, the entity on whose behalf Plaintiff brings this suit, was extinguished when the merger with 
Programming Acquisitions was completed on April 26, 2006. Thus, if Plaintiff has standing to bring a 
derivative claim on behalf ofMBC, it must do so within one ofthe two above-stated exceptions. 
In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the Delaware Chancery Court in November, 2005, ordered a 
corporate dissolution and auction as the means to dilute its interest in MBC. Plaintiff also alleges that 
five months later Defendants formed Programming Acquisition for the purpose of completing, then 
Defendants subsequently approving, a cash-out merger ofMBC for $1 without ensuring independent 
approval or valuation for the merger. While the complaint states that the "sole purpose" ofthe merger 
was to ''wipe out J&1's non-dilutable interest for a grossly unfair price," the facts alleged by Plaintiff 
are sufficient to establish that they may also have been done to eliminate PlaintifPs legal recourse, 
such as a derivative action. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff pled facts in its complaint sufficient to raise the fraudulent merger 
exception to the standing requirement in order to survive Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 
VI. Demand Requirement for Derivative Actions 
The issue of whether or not Plaintiff satisfied the demand requirement for a derivative action, while 
originally pursued by the Defendants and briefed by both parties, was not argued before the Court and 
appears to have been abandoned. Regardless, the issue shall be addressed in this Order. 
Defendants originally sought a partial motion to dismiss PlaintifPs derivative claims arguing that 
Plaintiff did not sufficiently meet the demand requirement for derivative action. In order to bring a 
derivative action, a plaintiff must first make a demand upon the board of directors of the company on 
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whose behalf Plaintiff seeks recovery, or, in the alternative, if such demand is not feasible, the plaintiff 
must plead with particularity why demand was excused. Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23.1 ("In a derivative action 
brought by 1 or more shareholders or members to enforce a right of a corporation ... the complaint 
shall allege that the plaintiffwas a shareholder or member at the time ofthe transaction of which the 
plaintiff complains or that the plaintiffs share or membership thereafter devolved on the plaintiff by 
operation of law. The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by 
plaintiffto obtain the action the plaintiff desired from the directors or comparable authority and the 
reasons for the plaintiffs failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort); see also, Brehm v. 
Eisner, 746 A. 2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
The demand requirement is excused if a plaintiff pleads particularized facts that create a reasonable 
doubt as to (1) the majority ofthe directors are disinterested and independent or (2) the complained of 
action was a valid exercise of reasonable business judgment. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254. The 
presumption is that a board of directors acts correctly and the burden is on the plaintiff to plead 
otherwise. Id. (holding that the sufficiently plead particularized facts are required to establish excused 
demand in a derivative action). Demand futility is recognized where the majority of the board is 
comprised of interested directors. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 809 (Del. 1984); cf, Brehm v. 
Eisner 746 A.2d 244 (finding that the plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to establish connection· 
between the defendant and the board of directors necessary to undermine the presumption in favor of 
the board). 
Here, Plaintiff alleged in its complaint that the Defendants were the individual owners of the 
majority shareholder, Willie Gary LLC, were on the management board ofMBC that approved the 
merger transactions, and are the owners of Programming Acquisitions, the company into which MBC 
was merged. Additionally, Plaintiffs alleged in its complaint that the merger was an interested party 
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transaction, but that Defendants did not establish an independent committee to review the merger, did 
not hire an independent expert to value the company, and did not hire counsel to represent the minority 
shareholders in the mergers. Thus, this Court finds that the Plaintiffhas pled sufficient facts to satisfy 
the demand futility requirement for derivative actions by creating reasonable doubt that a majority of 
the directors were disinterested and independent. 
In accordance with the above-stated reasons, this Court hereby DENIES Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss. 
SO ORDERED this 10th day of October, 2007. 
- --
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